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MARK SCHILLER*

The History and Adjudication of the
Antonio Chávez Grant
ABSTRACT
The Antonio Chávez Land Grant was a valid Mexican land claim
whose adjudication was the basis for Hayes v. United States, 170
U.S. 637 (1898), one of several pivotal Supreme Court cases that
unjustly overturned legal presumptions that protected Mexican
land grant claimants. In this case, it was the presumption that the
official or government body that made a grant (or a copy thereof)
did, in fact, have the authority to do so. The theory behind the
reversal of presumption originated in an ungrounded assertion (i.e.,
one that had no basis in Spanish or Mexican law) that was
formalized into a legal precedent by U.S. Attorney for the Court of
Private Land Claims, Matthew Reynolds.
The Court of Private Land Claims (CPLC), (created by a
Congressional Act in 1891 “to provide for the settlement of private land
claims in certain States and Territories”)1 whose tenure ran from 1891 to
1904, adjudicated the vast majority of Spanish and Mexican land claims
(282) in the New Mexico Territory stemming from the Mexican-American
War. Excluding the patently fraudulent Peralta Reavis claim,2 more than 22
million acres were claimed, but fewer than two million acres were actually
confirmed by the court. In its 2004 General Accounting Office report (GAO
Report), Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo: Findings and Possible Options
Regarding Longstanding Community Land Grant Claims in New Mexico,
the U.S. federal government implies that this gross discrepancy was the
result of the reform of a confirmation process that was previously riddled

* Mark Schiller is co-editor of La Jicarita News, a community advocacy newspaper that
focuses on social and environmental justices issues in northern New Mexico. He has worked
with Malcolm Ebright on the New Mexico Land Grant History Project and with New Mexico
Legal Aid on a response to the 2004 GAO Report on community land grants. He is currently
working on a book about the adjudication of New Mexico land grants. The funding for this
article was provided by the New Mexico Historical Records Advisory Board.
1. An Act to Establish a Court of Private Land Claims, 26 Stat. 854 (1891).
2. “The most spectacular forgery case in which [William] Tipton [lead expert for the
government concerning archival land grant records] testified was the Peralta-Reavis
grant…Tipton testified that the documents through which [James Addison] Reavis was
claiming some twelve million acres of land [in Arizona and New Mexico] were entirely forged
because they were written with a steel pen and modern ink instead of a quill pen and the ink
used in the third quarter of the eighteenth century when the documents were supposed to
have been written. In addition the handwriting was a poor copy the of the writing then in
vogue.” (The claim was thereby entirely defeated.) MALCOLM EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS AND
LAWSUITS IN NORTHERN NEW MEXICO 236 (1994).
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with corruption and fraud. The facts, however, suggest that it was the direct
result of a colonialist policy to keep as much land in the U.S. public domain
as possible by legislatively and judicially circumventing the terms of the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. This article examines the history of one land
claim that is emblematic of that policy.
Historian Richard Wells Bradfute has characterized the U.S.
Attorney for the CPLC, Matthew G. Reynolds, as a man “dedicated to the
defeat of as many claims, as possible. If he could not defeat them, he strove
to reduce the acreage confirmed as much as possible.”3 In his 1894 Report
to the Attorney General summing up the yearly activities of his office,
Reynolds boasted:
In New Mexico and Arizona the total area claimed in the suits
disposed of…was 4,784,651 acres; amount confirmed, 779,611
acres; amount rejected and not confirmed 4,005,040 acres. The
result is very gratifying to me…you will notice that in most of
the grants where judgments were obtained, the areas have
been much reduced…the amount of land saved in this way
alone during the term of court just past will more than
compensate the Government for the cost of this court and the
salaries of its officials during the entire time for which it was
created.4
He went on to state explicitly whose interests he represented:
The celebrated Cochiti cases, four in number, were all tried,
two defeated entirely and the other two so reduced in area as
to make a complete victory for the Government, and this has
relieved the public excitement growing out of fear that
confirmations might be made so as to include the recently
developed mining district covered by these claims.5
In his 1892 Report to the U.S. Attorney General, Reynolds acknowledged
the government’s unjust advantage over impoverished, non-Englishspeaking Mexican claimants stating, “those holding the small grants and
those owned by the communities, I have no doubt are being delayed from

3.

RICHARD WELLS BRADFUTE, THE COURT OF PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS, THE ADJUDICATION

OF SPANISH AND MEXICAN LAND GRANT TITLES (1891–1904) 220–21 (1975). Land grant historian

Victor Westphall states, “[a]rguably…Reynolds was in the position of a public prosecutor.
With the code of professional ethics of a later date, a lawyer in such a role would be obligated
to see justice was done, not to win.” VICTOR WESTPHALL, MERCEDES REALES, HISPANIC LAND
GRANTS OF THE UPPER RIO GRANDE REGION 261 (1983).
4. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
FOR THE CPLC, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S ANNUAL REPORT, NO. 3318, H. EXEC. DOC. NO. 7, at 3–4
(3d Sess. 1894).
5. Id.
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ignorance in many cases, and often from inability to obtain counsel to
prosecute their claims.”6
The bias evident in Reynolds’ reports clearly demonstrates that he
was not a public servant dedicated to the “just” prosecution of Spanish and
Mexican land claims, but a colonial bureaucrat whose job, during this era
of aggressive expansionism and overt racism,7 was to defeat or reduce all
claims, regardless of their validity, in order to make land available for
capitalist development and Anglo settlement. Historian Roxanne DunbarOrtiz asserts:
When land monopolists overreached themselves, the
government stepped in, not to protect the property interests
of the Spanish and Mexican grantees under the Treaty [of
Guadalupe Hidalgo], but rather to protect its own interest in
maintaining control over the public domain. An integral part
of the development of capitalism is the role of the state in
limiting the accessions of individual monopolists that could
hinder the flow and circulation of capital necessary for its
continued growth.…Speculators did, however, perform the
important function of dispossessing the many subsistence
owners of the land essential for capitalist development of the
area.8
Reynolds’ actions in the adjudication of the Antonio Chávez Grant near
Socorro graphically demonstrate this colonialist bias. His 1894 Report to the
U.S. Attorney General concerning this adjudication states, “I deem this case
one of the most important I have tried, as it settles the legal status of quite
a number of other claims in the Territory that are pending before this
Court.”9 Reynolds’ message to the Attorney General was prophetic; he went

6.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

FOR THE CPLC, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S ANNUAL REPORT, NO. 3097, H. EXEC. DOC. NO. 7, at 6 (2d

Sess. 1892).
7. During an 1847 debate in the Senate regarding the annexation of New Mexico,
Senator Lewis Cass of Michigan stated, “Senator Calhoun…has submitted many sound
observations respecting the diversity of races and institutions, which exist between us and
Mexico, and he deprecates…the union of the Mexican people and ours. I fully agree, sir; in
all that. It would be a deplorable amalgamation. No such evil will happen to us in our day.
We do not want the people of Mexico, either as citizens or subjects. All we want is a portion
of territory…with a population, which would soon recede or identify itself with ours.” CONG.
GLOBE, 29th Cong., 2d Session, Vol. 2, 369 (1847). See also REGINALD HORSMAN, RACE AND
MANIFEST DESTINY (1981) (discussing this issue thoroughly).
8. ROXANNE DUNBAR ORTIZ, ROOTS OF RESISTANCE, LAND TENURE IN NEW MEXICO
(1680–1980) 95, 101 (1980).
9. MATTHEW G. REYNOLDS, REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL
REGARDING CPLC CASE 37, THE ANTONIO CHAVEZ GRANT (Feb. 8, 1894) (on file with the Center
for Southwest Research, Univ. of N.M., Albuquerque, N.M. (CSWR), Catron Collection,
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on to employ the precedent established by the defeat of this legitimate land
claim to defeat other legitimate claims. A review of the facts surrounding
the Antonio Chávez decision, however, reveals that this legal precedent was
predicated on a specious technicality regarding the authority of the Mexican
governor and the Mexican Territorial Deputation to make the Grant, and an
incredibly narrow interpretation of the court’s mandate, which completely
ignored Spanish and Mexican custom and practice. It also demonstrates the
limits to which credulity and justice were stretched in order to
accommodate the demands of colonial expansion.
The history of the Antonio Chávez Grant and its judicial review by
the U.S. government is a complicated story that evolved into a battle
between the federal government and a powerful capitalist entrepreneur
whose collateral victims were the residents of Indo-Hispano community
and private land grants. Antonio Chávez was a nineteenth-century elite
who lived in the ranching and farming settlement of Belén, about half way
between Albuquerque and Socorro, New Mexico. Sometime before
February 16, 1825, Chávez petitioned the Mexican Territorial Deputation
requesting a tract of land he referred to as the “San Lorenzo Arroyo” for the
purposes of pasturing his livestock and expanding his agricultural
operation.10
He stated that the land was uncultivated and that the Grant would
contribute to the general security of the area by thwarting attacks by the
Navajos and other nomadic tribes that raided the neighboring settlements
and stole their livestock.11
On February 16, 1825, the six members of the Mexican Territorial
Deputation noted that they were passing the petition on to the “Political
Chief [i.e., the governor] of this Territory”12 in order for him to report
whether the land Antonio Chávez requested was part of the Socorro and
Sevilleta land grants, and if so, whether the new Grant would impinge upon
those settlements or impair their water rights.13
On February 25, 1825, Mexican Territorial Governor Bartolomé
Baca responded at length, listing five reasons why he felt the Grant should
be made. First, and most important, it would provide a cadre of armed
herders who would help protect the area from attack by nomadic tribes.
Second, although the new Grant overlapped a small portion of the two
existing grants, there remained ample land “for pastures, fields, uses, and

Correspondence, frames 400699–707).
10. Grant papers for the Antonio Chávez Grant ( Feb. 16, 1825), Spanish Archives of N.M.
(SANM), SG 79, roll 1, frames 221–33 [hereinafter Chávez Grant] (on file with the N.M. State
Records Ctr. and Archives, Santa Fe, N.M. (NMSRCA)).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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transits so that the land which may be granted to Chávez will cause them
not the least scarcity…[and] far from being injurious to those settlements,
there results to them a benefit” [from the presence of the armed herders].14
Third, that the presence of Chávez’s armed herders would also “make the
desirable vacant lands of the Bosque del Apache and San Pasqual”15 safe for
settlement by local colonists whose land was “full of locusts and worn out
by constant cultivation.”16 Fourth, that the petition would allow Chávez to
re-establish his livestock business after substantial losses due to Navajo
raids. Fifth, rather than the concession damaging the surrounding grants,
it would provide employment for the poverty-stricken members of those
settlements. “For all these reasons and many others which I omit…I am of
the opinion that the petition of Antonio Chávez may be acceded to at
once.”17
Upon receiving the recommendation of the governor, the Mexican
Territorial Deputation, on March 3, 1825, approved the Grant and
instructed Chávez to “present himself to the Alcalde of Socorro that he may
place him in possession.…”18
On April 20, 1825, Alcalde Juan Francisco Baca, accompanied by
two Aldermen of the ayuntamiento (the local governing board) and two
other residents of the district, all of whom acted as witnesses, signed the act
of possession and placed Chávez in possession of the tract with the
following boundaries: “on the north, where the small table land of the
Alamillo begins; on the east the del Norte River; on the south, a small
forked cedar tree in the middle of the bend of the Pablo García Ranch…on
the same side [of] the main road which is traveled towards Socorro.…[and]
on the west, the spring known as the Jara Spring.”19 The document goes on
to say that the alcalde (a local official with judicial, executive, and police
powers) took Chávez by the hand “and he in observance of the customary

14. Chávez needed water for both his farming and ranching operations. Because the
Socorro and Sevilleta grants occupied all the land along the river, it was necessary for them
to donate a piece of land to the Chávez tract in order for him to have access for irrigation.
This, as the governor references, did not significantly impair those two grants’ water rights
or agricultural lands. See J.J. Bowden, Private Land Claims in the Southwest 197–98 n.1 (1969)
(unpublished Master’s Thesis, Southern Methodist University) (on file with Univ. of N.M.
School of Law Library).
15. Chávez Grant, supra note 10.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. “[P]or el norte, en donde parte la Mesita del Alamillo; por oriente, el Rio de Norte; por el
sur un sabinito orqetudo que esta en la enmediation del rincon del rancho de Pablo García, que
communte llaman. Este sabinito esta para el lado del camino real que se transita al direcion Socorro,
a la parte de la vega; y por el poniente, el ojo conocido de la Jara.” Hayes v. United States, 170 U.S.
637 (1898) (Spanish language included as “Exhibit B”).
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ceremonies shouted long endure the nation and our independence and long
live the sovereign, and he shouted and plucked up herbs, cast stones, and
praised the name of God.…”20
As these carefully recorded procedures demonstrate, the granting
process was a highly formalized, thoroughly documented, official
procedure. More importantly, it addressed the two fundamental criteria the
Spanish and Mexican governments had for making land grants: (1) to
expand the areas of settlement in order to provide protection against the
incursions of hostile nomadic tribes and other intruders, and (2) to provide
for the subsistence needs of the colonists.21 According to land grant
historian Malcolm Ebright, continuous settlement and/or use of a grant
were the most important criteria for land title validation under both Spanish
and Mexican governance.22 These criteria would be completely ignored by
the CPLC and the Supreme Court when they adjudicated the claim.
Antonio Chávez remained in possession of the Grant until February
12, 1835, when he transferred ownership to his wife, Monica Pino de
Chávez.23 She maintained possession until October 26, 1850, at which time
she sold the Grant to Anastacio García, Rafael Luna, and Ramon Luna.24 The
two Lunas were members of the elite family that founded Los Lunas, just
south of Albuquerque.
The new owners began the process to confirm title under U.S.
governance on August 15, 1873, when Ramon Luna and Anastacio García
submitted a petition to Surveyor General James K. Proudfit on behalf of
“themselves, and the heirs of Rafael Luna and all others interested in said

20. Id.
21. Regarding the establishment of the Las Trampas Grant in 1751, for example,
Governor Tómas Veléz Cachupín wrote, “it appears that the inhabitants of this said city
[Santa Fe] have increased to a great extent…[and] there is not land or water sufficient for their
support. Neither have they any other occupation…excepting agriculture and the raising of
stock and whereas in the King’s domains which are unoccupied there are lands which up to
this time are uncultivated and which will yield comforts to those who cultivate them…[and]
from which the further benefit will result that hostile Indians will not travel over them and
will serve as a barrier against their entrance to despoil the interior settlements…I hereby
assign and distribute said site.…” Town of Las Trampas Grant by Governor Tomás Vélez
Cachupín (July 15, 1751), SANM, SG 27, roll 16, frame 298 (on file with NMSRCA).
22. “The decisions of alcaldes, governors, and the Mexican asesor, on land grant issues
emphasized settlement and continuous occupation of the land as the most important factors
in land grant validity.” EBRIGHT, supra note 2, at 133.
23. Conveyance of title to the Antonio Chávez Land Grant from Antonio Chávez to his
wife, Monica Pino de Chávez (Feb. 12, 1835), SANM, PLC 37, roll 36, frames 776–78 (on file
with NMSRCA).
24. Conveyance of title to the Antonio Chávez Grant by Monica Pino de Chávez to Rafael
Luna, Anastacio García and Ramon Luna (Oct. 26, 1850), SANM, SG 79, roll 21, frames 231–33
(on file with NMSRCA).
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grant.”25 The petition gave a very basic outline of the Grant’s origin, its sale
to the Petitioners, and the boundaries designated in the act of possession.
While the Petitioners included a sketch map of the Grant, they declined to
make an estimate of its approximate area.26
Some time after the petition was submitted and prior to January of
1874, U.S. Commissioner Joseph C. Hill took a deposition from Juan
Francisco Baca, the alcalde of Socorro who put Chávez in possession of the
Grant. Baca testified that he had placed Chávez in possession “in due form
of law” and that both the original and current owners had continuously
occupied the Grant.27
On January 5, 1874, Surveyor General Proudfit wrote a brief
account of the Grant and recommended “that the title to the land according
to the boundaries set forth in the act of possession be confirmed to the legal
representatives of Antonio Chávez.…”28 Congress, however, did not act
upon the Surveyor General’s recommendation and the claim, like dozens
of others, remained in limbo.
During this period, the Grant changed hands several times.
Although we know from the record in the CPLC file that Anastacio García
sold his one-third interest in the Grant in 1884 to New York investor Hiram
G. Bond for ten thousand dollars, it is unclear how or when the Lunas’ twothirds was conveyed to a group of Anglo investors that included Hiram and
his wife Laura Bond, Charles D. Arms of Youngstown, Ohio, and Latham
A. Higgins of Denver.29 We also know from the record that they in turn
conveyed the Grant, as well as another tract to the south of the Antonio
Chávez Grant, in 1886, to Denver investor, Martin B. Hayes, for whom the
subsequent Supreme Court case would be named.30 However, according to

25. Petition submitted for confirmation of the Antonio Chávez Grant to Surveyor General
James K. Proudfit (Aug. 15, 1873), SANM, SG 79, roll 21, frames 236–239; sketch map, frame
241 (on file with NMSRCA).
26. Id.
27. Testimony of Juan Francisco Baca, H. EXEC. DOC. NO. 149, at 3–4 (1st Sess. 1873).
28. Recommendation for confirmation of the Antonio Chávez Grant by Surveyor
General, James K. Proudfit (Jan. 5, 1874), SANM, SG 79, roll 21, frame 248 (on file with
NMSRCA).
29. Conveyance of one-third interest in the Antonio Chávez Grant from Anastacio García
and his wife, Cruz Apodoca de García, to Hiram G. Bond (Mar. 13, 1884), SANM, PLC 37, roll
36, frames 771–74 (on file with NMSRCA).
30. There are two conveyances in the CPLC file, one from the Bonds to Hayes (June 2,
1886), SANM, PLC 37, roll 36, 764–66 (on file with NMSRCA), and the other from the Arms
to Hayes, (June 3, 1886), SANM, PLC 37, roll 36, frames 768–69 (on file with NMSRCA). These
contracts transferred the land to Hayes for one dollar each. However, on June 2, 1886, Hayes
also entered into a contract with the Bonds, the Arms, and the Estate of Higgins to take
possession of the Grant and adjoining tract for a consideration of $60,000 payment which was
deferred for two years at an 8 percent interest rate. The Bonds, the Arms, and the Estate of
Higgins ultimately brought suit against Hayes for non-payment in 1890, and, in October 1893,
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Hayes’ testimony before the CPLC in 1893, he actually “became connected”
with the Grant in 1873 or 1874.
It is difficult to know exactly what Hayes meant by “became
connected,” but he did testify that he paid for an 1877 survey of the Grant
by the Office of the Surveyor General, which he subsequently protested,
claiming it included land that did not belong to the Grant and excluded
land that did. He was able to have it resurveyed in 1878.31 The June 1878
resurvey determined that the Grant included 130,138.98 acres. On August
10, 1878, Surveyor General Henry M. Atkinson, who had succeeded
Proudfit, approved that survey.32 Although there would subsequently be a
great deal of testimony and controversy regarding the actual location of the
boundaries of this Grant, it played no part in the final outcome of the
adjudication.
Congress did not consider the Antonio Chávez claim until 1882,
when the commissioner of the General Land Office, N.C. McFarland,
reported to the Committee on Private Land Claims that “[t]he grant is valid
and legal, inasmuch as it was made by a legally constituted body—the
provincial deputation—with the approval of the governor or jefe político, the
highest civil authority of the province.” He went on to say, “I would suggest
that confirmation be made, as recommended by the surveyor general, as
such confirmation embraces representatives of such grantee by contract, as
well as by operation of law.”33
Congress, however, still took no action on the claim and the
Surveyor General files on this case conclude with a third Surveyor General,
George W. Julian, re-examining the claim on November 5, 1886. Julian was
appointed by President Grover Cleveland ostensibly to “reform” the

an auction of the tract was ordered. Hayes somehow managed to maintain control of the tract,
however, because he was still the ostensible owner when the Supreme Court heard the case
in 1897. Compounding the complexity of this arrangement is the fact that the group that
brought suit against Hayes for non-payment was represented by John H. Knaebel, who
represented Hayes before both the CPLC and the Supreme Court. The agreement between
Hayes and the other investors was obviously suspicious. See Records of the Fifth Judicial
District of the Territory of N.M., County of Socorro, Case No. 2381, SANM (on file with
NMSRCA). Further complicating an understanding of the chain of title of the Grant is a brief
article found in the Silver City Enterprise from July 11, 1884, when Hayes was the owner of the
Santa Rita (Chino) copper mine in that area. See infra note 93. The article reads:
Martin B. Hayes, well known in this county through his connection with the Santa
Rita copper property, has brought suit against H.G. Bond, of New York, in the second district
U.S. court of the territory, for a large interest in a grant of land the sale of which he negotiated.
31. Testimony of Martin B. Hayes before the CPLC (Nov. 1893), Catron Collection,
frames 400777–92 (on file with CSWR).
32. Bowden, supra note 14, at 200.
33. N.C. MCFARLAND, COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE, REPORT TO THE
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS, NO. 1501 (1st Sess. 1882).
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adjudication process after the scandal caused by the confirmations of the
grossly exaggerated Maxwell and Sangre de Cristo land grants. The
government’s real agenda, however, as evidenced by the fact that Julian
reviewed numerous claims previously recommended for confirmation by
his predecessors and then recommended rejecting most of them, was to
keep as much land in the public domain as possible.
President Cleveland could not have chosen a better man for the job.
Formerly a congressman from Indiana and one of the drafters of the
Homestead Act, Julian believed, with the self-righteous zeal of a Calvinist
minister, that the pastoral life was redemptive and that an army of yeoman
farmers would create an agricultural utopia in the west.34 In his 1887 article
“Land Stealing in New Mexico” in the North American Review, he suggested
that as a result of his reform of the land grant adjudication process
[t]he stream of settlers now crossing the Territory [of New
Mexico] in search of homes on the Pacific will be arrested by
the new order of things and poured into her valleys and
plains. Small land-holdings, thrifty tillage, and compact
settlements will supersede great monopolies, slovenly
agriculture, and industrial stagnation. The influx of an
intelligent and enterprising population will insure the
development of the vast mineral wealth of the Territory, as
well as the settlement of her lands.…35
Julian’s vision of this “intelligent and enterprising population,”
however, clearly excluded the Mexican and Native American populations
already farming and ranching the territory. In personal journal entries from
his New Mexico years he referred to the “stagnation of the natives” and the
“prevailing tendency here to degenerate into barbarism.”36 He referred to
New Mexican homes as “the piles of mud in which the people of Santa Fe
are domiciled” and dismissed the entire Territory, claiming “[t]here is no
future for this country in sight, and nothing in fact to keep any civilized

34. In a speech before Congress during the debate over the Homestead, Bill Julian stated:
“The life of a farmer is peculiarly favorable to virtue; and both individuals and communities
are generally happy in proportion as they are virtuous. His manners are simple and his nature
unsophisticated. If not oppressed by other interests, he generally possesses an abundance
without the drawback of luxury. His life does not impose excessive toil, and yet it discourages
idleness. The farmer lives in rustic plenty, remote from the contagion of popular vices, and
enjoys, in their greatest fruition, the blessings of health and contentment.” HENRY NASH
SMITH, VIRGIN LAND, THE AMERICAN WEST AS SYMBOL AND MYTH 197 (1961); CONG. GLOBE,
31st Cong., 2d Sess. 137 (1851).
35. George W. Julian, Land Stealing in New Mexico, 145 N. AM. REV. 17–31 (1887).
36. Journal of George W. Julian, Aug. 2, 1885, Oct. 11, 1885, & Sept. 2, 1888 (on file at the
Ind. State Library, Indianapolis, Ind.).
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man here but the climate.”37 His actions as Surveyor General reflect these
sentiments.
In his zeal to expose what he termed the “systematic robbery of the
[U.S.] Government”38 and ensure New Mexico fulfilled its “manifest
destiny,” Julian often asserted that legitimate claims were fraudulent and
deliberately misinterpreted the facts to underscore his accusations. He then
broadcast these hyperbolized accounts in the mainstream media and special
reports, whipping up a furor of public and congressional indignation.
Julian’s biographer, Patrick W. Riddleberger, suggests that for Julian,
“stimulation often came more from hatred of his enemies, real or supposed,
than from a recognition of social and economic needs.”39
Julian’s actions with regard to the Antonio Chávez claim were
typical of many of the cases he reviewed: challenging the legitimacy of the
claim and the proceedings of the surveyors general who preceded him by
making unsubstantiated accusations based on misinterpretation and
innuendo.
Let me cite just a few examples: first, after briefly outlining the
history of the Grant and conceding that “[t]he certified copy of the grant
and the proceedings thereunder, as taken from the record of said assembly,
are duly authenticated and the testimony of one witness, the alcalde who
delivered the possession, is produced.…” Julian, without specifically
quoting from the deposition, questioned the legitimacy of the alcalde’s
testimony stating, “[t]his witness, however, makes the date of the juridical
delivery three years before the date of the grant.”40 In fact, the alcalde, who
stated his age as 85 at the time of the deposition and who was recalling
events that had occurred almost 50 years before, said, “[T]his was about the
year 1822. I am not very certain as to the exact date.”41
Next, having cast doubt upon the legitimacy of the alcalde’s
testimony, Julian claimed, “There is no evidence that the grantee complied
with the conditions of the royal laws under which all such grants were
made.”42 Once again, going back to the alcalde’s testimony we find that he
said that Antonio Chávez “took possession and kept continuous possession
of the same until his death. His heirs sold the sitio [in Spanish “sitio” is a
place, site, or location] to Ramon Luna, Rafael Luna, and Anastacio García.

37. Id.
38. Julian, supra note 35.
39. R. Hal Williams, George W. Julian and Land Reform in New Mexico, 1885–1889, 41 AGRIC.
HIST. 83 (1967) (quoting PATRICK W. RIDDLEBERGER, GEORGE WASHINGTON JULIAN, RADICAL
REPUBLICAN: A STUDY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY POLITICS AND REFORM 305 (1953)).
40. Surveyor General George W. Julian, Review of the Antonio Chávez claim (Nov. 5,
1886), SANM, SG 79, Roll 21, frames 264–66 (on file with NMSRCA).
41. Testimony of Juan Francisco Baca, supra note 27.
42. Julian, supra note 40.
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They have continuously occupied said sitio up to the present time. I am not
interested in the said sitio or tract of land in any manner whatsoever.”43 So
clearly, according to the alcalde, Antonio Chávez and the subsequent owners
had complied with occupancy conditions of the colonization laws, and
Julian was ignoring the testimony of a witness who had no apparent reason
to lie.
Julian went on to say, “Moreover, the grant was made under the
Mexican colonization law of 1824, according to which it could not exceed
one square league of land, or a fraction over 4,340 acres; but it is surveyed
under the direction of this office for 130,000 acres and its confirmation
recommended to this extent.”44 Once again Julian was wrong. The Mexican
Colonization Law of 1824 limited each individual grantee to eleven square
leagues45 or approximately 48,000 acres, but even then, under Mexican
governance, these laws were tempered by custom, usage, and politics.
There were other instances of grants made to elites during the Mexican
Period that exceeded the 11 square-league provision, which Congress had,
in fact, already confirmed.46 It is also significant that this Grant was made
specifically for grazing Chávez’ livestock herds, which were substantial.47
In a part of New Mexico as arid as the Socorro area, 130,000 acres was not
excessive. By comparison, the Pino Grant, another grazing Grant made to
an elite at about the same time and in an area that was less arid, exceeded
300,000 acres and withstood two protests charging impairment of existing
grazing rights brought by residents of a neighboring grant to the Mexican
Governor and Territorial Deputation in 1824 and 1825.48
Julian then went on to question the legitimacy of the survey and the
honesty of the surveyors stating, “The facts connected with the survey
excite suspicion and distrust as to the entire transaction.”49 While there
definitely had been instances of grossly exaggerated surveys in the past

43. Testimony of Juan Francisco Baca, supra note 27.
44. Julian, supra note 40.
45. “It shall not be allowed that more than one square league [sic] of irrigable land, four
of temporal land, and six of range land, be united as a property in a single hand.” MATTHEW
G. REYNOLDS, SPANISH AND MEXICO LAND LAWS: NEW SPAIN AND MEXICO 122 (1895) (quoting
Mexican Colonization Laws, No. 12, Decree of Aug. 18, 1824).
46. Grants made under the same authority and which exceeded the 11 square-league
provision, but were confirmed by Congress, include the Pino Grant (better known as the
Preston Beck Grant) at 318,699.72 acres and the Pablo Montoya Grant, at 655,468.07 acres.
Bowden, supra note 14, at 677–86, 700–05.
47. Testimony of Jesus Baca before the CPLC (Nov. 1893), Catron Collection, frames
400777–792 (on file with CSWR). See the discussion of Baca’s testimony before the CPLC, infra
notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
48. See SANM I, Archives 708, 899, 1153 (detailing the formal protest of the Pino Grant
in 1824 and 1825) (on file with NMSRCA).
49. Julian, supra note 40.

1068

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 48

(most notably the Maxwell Grant), the reports contained in the Surveyor
General’s file simply do not bear out Julian’s accusations. In point of fact,
the most telling commentary regarding his accusations about the survey
came implicitly from Matthew G. Reynolds himself; while all of Julian’s
accusations regarding the 1878 survey were directed at the location of the
southern boundary call, it was the location of the western boundary that
Reynolds attacked during the trial before the CPLC.50 Reynolds, who rarely
missed an opportunity to challenge a boundary call and was well aware of
Julian’s review, never questioned the southern boundary as approved by
Surveyor General Atkinson.
Although Julian did not present one shred of valid evidence that
substantively challenged the Grant or survey’s legitimacy, he concluded his
review by recommending the claim be rejected.51 In his 1887 article “Land
Stealing in New Mexico” he went even further, charging that in the case of
the Arroyo de Lorenzo (an alternate name for the Antonio Chávez Grant)
the government was “defrauded” by the claim and boasted, “In dealing
with the enormous theft of the national patrimony, I do not speak at
random, but on the authority of ascertained facts.”52
Julian’s bombastic denunciation of the Antonio Chávez claim and
other legitimate claims, including the Town of Las Vegas Grant in which he
first promulgated the theory that title to the common lands did not vest in
the communities to which they pertained, set the stage for Reynolds, who
continued Julian’s crusade when Congress created the CPLC in 1891 to
adjudicate all unresolved land claims.
On September 24, 1892, Martin B. Hayes submitted a petition for
the Antonio Chávez Grant to the CPLC. His petition recited the outline of
the Grant’s history and stated that “title to the said tract of land…was
complete and perfect before and at the time of the cession of New Mexico
to the United States of America,”53 asserting it therefore met the Court’s
mandate for approval. Hayes’ petition also noted the previous reviews of
the Grant, including the favorable opinions of Proudfit and McFarland and
the negative opinion of Julian, which it discounted as “perfunctory and
unjudicial…and without any lawful authority.”54 It stated, “The said
granted tract of land has been correctly surveyed by the said United States,”
included a map of that survey, and traced Hayes’ line of title.55

50. Testimony from the trial of the Antonio Chávez land claim before the CPLC (Mar. 16,
1893) SANM, PLC 37, roll 36, frames 685–710 (on file with NMSRCA).
51. Julian, supra note 40.
52. Julian, supra note 35, at 17.
53. Petition, CPLC for the Antonio Chávez Grant, (Sept. 2, 1892) SANM,PLC 37, roll 36,
frames 651–57; Map, frame 674 (on file with NMSRCA).
54. Id.
55. Id.

Fall 2008]

THE ANTONIO CHÁVEZ GRANT

1069

The trial commenced on December 13, 1892, and ran through
several terms of the Court, with the decision coming in November of 1893.
While the trial itself focused primarily on determining the western
boundary of the Grant and establishing whether occupancy requirements
had been met, Reynolds’ March 9, 1893 Answer to the Hayes petition
contested the legitimacy of the Grant on a variety of grounds. Most
importantly, he asserted that the Grant “was without any warrant or
authority of law, and in violation of the laws in existence, and contrary to
the policy as declared by the Mexican Republic.”56 Apparently Reynolds
had been waiting for the right land claim to present itself in order to test a
loophole he believed he had found while compiling his book, Spanish and
Mexican Land Laws.57 That is, between August 18, 1824, when the Mexican
congress passed a general colonization law stating, “The government, in
conformity with the principles established in this law, will proceed to the
colonization of the territories of the republic”58 and November 21, 1828,
when the Mexican congress passed more specific rules for that colonization
stating, “The governors of the territories are authorized…to grant vacant
lands in their respective territories to such contractors, families, or private
persons, whether Mexicans or foreigners who may ask for them for the
purpose of cultivating and inhabiting them,”59 only the chief executive of
the federal government had the authority to make a grant.60
I will withhold comment on this theory for the time being and finish
discussing the other deficiencies in the claim Reynolds listed in his Answer.
Reynolds’ Answer went on to challenge the location of the boundaries and
the quantity of land included therein. He asserted that the Mexican
government had already severed the portion of the Chávez Grant that
overlapped the Socorro and Sevilleta grants from the public domain and
therefore the Territorial Deputation had no authority to redistribute it.61 He
claimed that Antonio Chávez never fulfilled the residency requirement to

56. Answer for the U.S. Attorney of the Court, CPLC, Case No. 37 [hereinafter Answer
to Case No. 37] (Mar. 9, 1893), SANM, PLC 37, roll 36, frames 722–25 (on file with NMSRCA).
57. REYNOLDS, supra note 45. Historian Malcolm Ebright says of this book: “The
compilation has a substantial bias, both in the selection of the laws included and in the
summary of those laws in the prefatory ‘historical sketch.’ No mention is made of laws
making custom applicable to a particular situation or laws defining custom, and no mention
is made of the important rules of evidence and presumptions under Spanish and Mexican law.
When the courts accepted Reynolds’ book as the definitive statement of Spanish and Mexican
law, they adopted these biases, giving the government another substantial edge over land
grant claimants.” EBRIGHT, supra note 2, at 135–36.
58. FREDERIC HALL, THE LAWS OF MEXICO 149 (1885).
59. Id. at 150.
60. Answer to Case No. 37, supra note 56.
61. Id.
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perfect title and that the Grant was not as large as claimed.62 He finished by
requesting that the “plaintiff be put to his proof of all allegations in his
petition…[so] that a Decree may be entered rejecting the confirmation of
said alleged grant.…”63
Clearly Reynolds had thrown down the gauntlet and, despite the
regularity of the granting process and the fact that Congress had already
confirmed and patented grants such as the Preston Beck, the Pablo
Montoya, and the Domingo Fernández (Eathan W. Eaton), which were
granted on similar authority and exceeded the 11 square-league provision,
was hopeful that the court would sustain his main argument challenging
the presumption that the Governor and Territorial Deputation had the
authority to make the Grant.64 Attacking the claim on multiple fronts,
however, was typical of his strategy to reduce the claim as much as possible
if he could not entirely defeat it.
The trial continued on March 16, 1893, with Reynolds calling three
witnesses in order to establish two things: first, that there were two springs
in the area west of the Rio Grande both known or formerly known as La
Jara, which was the western boundary call of the Grant, with one spring
significantly further west than the other; and second, that neither Antonio
Chávez, nor the three men to whom his widow conveyed the Grant, had
ever fulfilled the occupancy requirement needed to perfect title to the Grant.
Although the issue of the granting authority’s power to make this Grant
would be decisive, the boundary and residency questions became the focus
of the trial testimony and the other issues were briefed.65
Nine witnesses appeared during the court’s following term (four for
the government and five for the plaintiffs), the most important of whom
was a local rancher named Jesus Baca. Baca, who was 75 at the time of the
trial, had been Antonio Chávez’s chief herdsman and was the only witness

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. The Preston Beck Grant was made by the Territorial Deputation on Dec. 23, 1823, and
the Grantee was placed in possession on Aug. 29, 1825. It was confirmed by Congress in 1860
and patented in 1883 for 318,699.72 acres. The Pablo Montoya Grant was recommended by
Governor Bartolome Baca on Nov. 19, 1824, and granted by the Territorial Deputation that
same day. It was confirmed by Congress in Mar. 3, 1869, and patented in 1877 for 655,468.07
acres. The Domingo Fernández Grant was recommended by the Provincial Deputation on
Aug. 8, 1827, and made by Governor Manuel Armijo on Aug. 9, 1827. It was confirmed by
Congress on June 21, 1860, and patented in 1880 for 81,032.67 acres. The Bosque del Apache
Grant, whose desired settlement Governor Baca claimed was contingent on the protection the
Chávez Grant would afford, although granted in 1845 under a different authority, was also
theoretically subject to the 11 square-league provision. It was confirmed by Congress in 1860
and patented in 1877 for 60,117.39 acres. Bowden, supra note 14, at 677–86 (Preston Beck),
700–05 (Pablo Montoya), 272–81 (Domingo Fernandez), 171–74 (Bosque del Apache).
65. Testimony from the trial of the Antonio Chávez, supra note 50.
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who could actually provide first-hand information regarding Chávez’s use
of the Grant and the location of its boundaries. Baca testified that Chávez
kept 3,000 sheep, 1,000 cattle, over 40 horses and 16 pigs on the Grant
during the almost nine years he worked for him. He further testified that
Chávez employed fourteen herdsmen who resided on the Grant and were
armed to prevent theft of the livestock by nomadic bands of Navajos, who,
he said, “were making a great deal of harm.”66
Baca then went on to discuss the western boundary of the Grant,
which he told the court Antonio Chávez himself had shown him. He
indicated that it was the La Jara Spring as shown on the 1878 Surveyor
General’s survey plat. In regard to the Ariveche Spring, which several of
Reynolds’ witnesses claimed was formerly known as La Jara and avowed
was the western boundary call of the Grant, Baca testified that the Ariveche
Spring was “inside of the Antonio Chávez grant” and that before it was
called Ariveche, because of the murder at the spring of an Apache
herdsman by that name, it was known as Chupidero, not La Jara.67 Hayes’
lawyer asked Baca if there were any willows (jaras in Spanish) growing
around the Ariveche. Baca responded, “There never have been any, neither
will there be any while there is a world.”68 He claimed that, because of the
small amount of water produced by that spring, “willows could not grow
there in those times when it would rain, much less grow there now when
it is so dry.”69
In response to further questioning about defending the Grant
against marauding Indians, Baca stated that the herdsmen defended the
Grant “[a]gainst the Indians and against the Spanish. I had orders as Caporal
[head herdsman] to drive from it all kinds of stock belonging to other
parties, and when the Indians came there, as a matter of course we had to
drive them out, [and] defend our homes against them.”70
Baca’s testimony clearly resolved the occupancy issue: although
Antonio Chávez did not himself reside on the Grant, he maintained a cadre
of armed herdsmen who lived there and defended it against livestock theft,
unauthorized grazing, and attack as he had promised in his petition.
Moreover, although there was a great deal of conflicting testimony
regarding the western boundary call, all of it except Baca’s was based on
hearsay; Baca’s testimony, based upon direct experience with Chávez
himself, should have been given more credence and, in fact, made far more

66. Testimony of Jesus Baca, supra note 47.
67. According to Baca’s testimony this meant “water-can” because “the quantity of water
taken from it was very small, and was only sufficient to be taken and put in barrels and not
sufficient to water the burros.” Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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sense since no one contested that the La Jara Spring, indicated in the 1878
survey as the western boundary, had substantially more water than the
Ariveche Spring. This water source obviously would have been critical for
grazing thousands of animals in this otherwise arid area. Adding credibility
to Baca’s testimony was the fact that he had no interest in the Grant and was
unflappable when cross-examined by Reynolds.
On December 4, 1893, the CPLC rendered a split decision, three to
two, finding the Grant was invalid for want of authority and dismissing the
claim.71 Hayes appealed the decision to the Supreme Court and, on May 23,
1898, the decision of the CPLC was upheld.72
The decisions made in this case speak to this article’s central point:
they reflect the colonialist bias of the U.S. government in regard to the New
Mexico territory. Specifically, the decision by the CPLC and its affirmation
by the Supreme Court were based on a specious legal technicality regarding
the granting authority of the Mexican governor and the Territorial
Deputation, a failure to consider Spanish and Mexican usage, and an
extraordinarily narrow interpretation of the authority of those two courts.
As previously noted, the decisions of both courts were predicated
on Reynolds’ assertion that between August 18, 1824, and November 21,
1828, only the chief executive of the Republic of Mexico had the authority
to sever land from the public domain, and that the executive had not
conferred that authority on anyone in the provincial government of New
Mexico. This position not only misreads the intent of the Mexican
government in promulgating the colonization laws of 1824 and the
historical context in which they were made, but also ignores the whole body
of customary law and usage that had developed in New Mexico since its recolonization in 1692.
Let us first examine the historical context leading up to the
colonization laws of 1824 and 1828 as outlined in Reynolds’ “Historical
Sketch,” which prefaces his own compilation, Spanish and Mexican Land
Laws. Mexico declared its independence from Spain on February 24, 1821,
when a group of revolutionaries formulated the Plan of Iguala. Their battle
for independence was consummated September 27, 1821, when General
Agustín de Iturbide captured Mexico City. A provisional government was
then established with Iturbide as the president. On February 24, 1822, a
congress elected according to the Plan of Iguala met in Mexico City and
appointed Iturbide emperor. On January 3, 1823, Iturbide, along with the

71. Decision, CPLC regarding the Antonio Chávez claim (Dec. 4, 1893), SANM, PLC 37,
roll 36, frames 864–73 (on file with NMSRCA). Unfortunately, Justices Fuller and Stone, who
dissented, filed no dissenting opinion, so there is no way of knowing what reservations
existed about the decision.
72. Hayes v. United States, 170 U.S. 637, 655 (1898).
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National Council, which had replaced the congress, promulgated the
Colonization Law of Iturbide. This law, among other things, authorized
ayuntaminetos (local councils) to make grants to individuals. However, on
March 7, 1823, Iturbide abdicated and, on January 31, 1824, a new congress
adopted a new constitution. On August 18, 1824, the new congress adopted
the Colonization Law of 1824, whose sixteenth article provided, “The
government, under the principles established in this law, shall proceed to
the colonization of the territories of the Republic.”73
In his brief to the Supreme Court regarding this issue, Reynolds
argued:
It does not seem that the executive branch of the Government
took any steps to carry into execution the powers conferred
by this article of the colonization law until November 21,
1828, when a very complete system of regulations was
promulgated, conferring authority upon the governors of the
Territories, with the approval of the Territorial deputations,
to grant the public lands subject to the restrictions imposed by
the colonization law under which regulations were issued.74
He went on to say:
If therefore we are to look to the law of August 18, 1824, for
authority, the [Antonio Chávez] grant having been made in
March, 1825,…it should appear that some regulation under
the sixteenth article of the colonization law had been
promulgated by the executive, but I do not believe that it has
been contended, at any stage of this litigation…that any
action on the part of the executive branch of the Mexican
Government looking to the disposition of the public lands in
the Territories had ever been taken prior to November 21,
1828; therefore it must resolve itself to the fact that within the
Territories between August 18, 1824, and November 21, 1828,
there was no Territorial official or official body authorized to
dispose of the public lands for the nation. It is true the
executive could have authorized any one he saw proper to
designate, but it fully appears that he did not exercise this
power.75
Reynolds’ assertion that no one but the federal executive had the
power to grant land from the public domain for a period of over four year’s
is pure sophistry. Even Reynolds’ own recital of this history concedes that

73. Reynolds, supra note 45, at 25–41.
74. Statement, Brief & Argument by the U.S. Government at 23, Hayes v. United States,
170 U.S. 637 (1898) (on file with the Natural Resources Journal).
75. Id. at 25.
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before and after this four-year period local officials had the authority to
grant land from the public domain. Why would the Mexican government,
which explicitly stated in the 1824 Colonization Law that it “shall proceed
to the colonization of the territories of the Republic,” because fortifying its
frontiers was critical to legitimizing its authority and protecting its frontiers
from the attacks of nomadic tribes and the colonialist intervention of France
and the United States, suddenly suspend the practice of empowering
territorial officials to make land grants when that process had been the basis
for consolidating and extending governmental authority in the region for
over 130 years? And why would it, after a period of four years, then
reinstitute and formalize that policy? Clearly the newly constituted federal
government, plagued by continuing civil, political, and military unrest
following the change in sovereignty from Spain to the Mexican Republic,
presumed that local authorities, especially in a Territory as remote as New
Mexico, would continue to make decisions critical to meeting their own
subsistence needs. Historian Marc Simmons asserts:
For twenty-five years, New Mexico was to remain part of the
Mexican nation, but as a close appendage rather than an
integral component. Self-reliance had become so inbred
among her people that they tended to exhibit a combination
of distrust and disinterest in matters of government unfolding
beyond the bounds of their own province. In fact, the political
unrest that kept Mexico City in perpetual turmoil throughout
this era confirmed New Mexicans in the belief that they
should manage their own affairs with as little outside
interference as possible. As it turned out, they were able to
achieve that because the repeated and often violent changes
of administration in the national capital so disrupted
functioning of the central government that outlying areas of
the country were left for long periods of time to their own
devices.76
In point of fact, Reynolds deliberately misconstrued the intent of the
colonization law by insisting it be interpreted in an absurdly narrow
manner rather than within its historical context.
This conclusion is further supported by information contained in
the Antonio Chávez Grant documents and the documents of other grants
made during this period under similar authority. As noted in the previous
discussion of the Antonio Chávez Grant papers, Governor Bartolomé Baca
listed several critical reasons for the Territorial Deputation to make the
grant: guarding the area against the depredations of marauding nomadic
tribes; inducing settlement on the neighboring Bosque del Apache and San

76.

MARC SIMMONS, NEW MEXICO, AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 109 (1988).
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Pasqual tracts in order to provide new, more fertile land to cultivate; and
creating employment for the impoverished settlers on neighboring grants.77
And, despite Reynolds’ protestations, all of this was accomplished by
making this Grant.
Another case in point is the Pablo Montoya Grant, also
recommended by Governor Baca and granted by the Territorial Deputation
on November 19, 1824. In his recommendation of that Grant, Baca “reported
that the primary cause for the decline of the livestock industry in New
Mexico was the failure of the government to grant sufficient pasture lands
to foster and encourage the expansion of that industry.”78
A third example is the Maragua Grant made March 6, 1826. In its
report to the Territorial Deputation, the Santa Fe ayuntamiento
recommended that body make the Grant “in order to promote the
agricultural industry.”79 In recommending the neighboring Gotera Grant
four years later, the local alcalde told the Territorial Deputation that if it
“continued to neglect the development of agriculture, Santa Fe would never
acquire sufficient supplies and would continue to be exposed to the
indigence, misery and wants which are so prevalent.”80 Clearly, the
Territorial government had to continue to grant land simply to meet the
subsistence needs of its colonists.
Moreover, all land grants made in New Mexico during this period,
and there were more than a dozen, had been made under the same local
authority and several had been confirmed by Congress. A reasonable test
of the Antonio Chávez Grant’s validity, for which there was a whole body
of legal precedent, would have been the question: Did the Mexican
government, during the 23 years (1825–48) from the time of its granting to
the time it was ceded to the United States, question its legitimacy or revoke
it? The answer, of course, is that it did not. Yet there is ample
documentation that both the Spanish and Mexican governments were not
reluctant to suspend or revoke grants when they thought it was
warranted.81 Furthermore, there is not a single instance in which the
Mexican government rescinded a grant made during its tenure because it
asserted that territorial officials exceeded their authority.
It should also be noted that in a previous Supreme Court ruling,
United States v. Peralta, 60 U.S. 343 (1856), the Court ruled, “The

77. Chávez Grant, supra note 10.
78. Bowden, supra note 14, at 700.
79. Id. at 458–59.
80. Id. at 451–52.
81. Under Spanish authority, the Diego de Velasco, Barranca, Manuel García de las Ribas,
José Antonio Torres, Juan Estevan García de Noriega, and Antonio de Ulibarri grants were
all revoked. Under Mexican authority, the Heath Grant in Texas was revoked, and the
Maxwell Grant was suspended pending an investigation, but was reinstated.
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presumption arising from the grant itself makes it prima facie evidence of
the power of the officer making it, and throws the burden of proof on the
party denying it.” Reynolds theory clearly did not fulfill that burden of
proof.
Regarding grants made during the same period under the same
authority that Congress had already confirmed, the CPLC, in keeping with
its policy of interpreting its mandate as narrowly as possible, stated in the
Antonio Chávez decision:
If this cause was pending before Congress, the position
assumed by counsel [for the plaintiffs] might be entitled to
favorable consideration. Congress, in its sovereign capacity,
has unlimited power over all questions growing out of
treaties made by the United States with foreign nations…[b]ut
this court has only such power and jurisdiction to try to
determine the rights of parties claiming grants to lands from
Spain and Mexico, as was conferred upon it by the act of
March 3, 1891.82
Both the CPLC and the Supreme Court’s authorities were limited by the
1891 Act to confirming grants whose title was “complete and perfect at the
date of the acquisition of the territory by the United States.…”83 The Grant’s
history, I believe, indicates this claim met that standard and the language
of the 1891 Act demonstrates both courts had the authority to acknowledge
it. Section 7 of the 1891 Act stated:
That all proceedings subsequent to the filing of said petition
shall be conducted as near as may be according to the practice
of the courts of equity of the United States.…The said court
shall have full power and authority to hear and determine all
questions arising in cases before it relative to the title to the
land…according to the law of nations, the stipulations of the treaty
concluded between the United States and the Republic of Mexico at
the city of Guadalupe Hidalgo…and the laws and ordinances of the
Government from which it is alleged to have been derived here.…”84
Interpreting this section of the Act in the 1898 Supreme Court case Ely’s
Administrator v. United States, the Court stated:
It must be remembered…that by section 7 of the act creating
the Court of Private Land Claims, it is provided ‘that all
proceedings subsequent to the filing of said petition shall be
conducted as near as may be according to the…courts of

82.
83.
84.

Decision, supra note 71.
An Act to Establish a Court of Private Land Claims, 26 Stat. 854, 860 (1891).
Id. at 857 (emphasis added).
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equity of the United States.’ Therefore in an investigation of
this kind that court is not limited to the dry, technical rules of
a court of law, but may inquire and establish that which
equitably was the land granted by the government of Mexico.
It was doubtless the purpose of Congress, by this enactment,
to provide a tribunal which should examine all claims and
titles, and that should, so far as was practicable in
conformance with equitable rules, finally settle and determine
the rights of all claimants.85
Clearly both courts had the authority and the obligation to decide this issue
as the government of Mexico would have during the period when the Grant
was made.
Ironically, the decision of the CPLC in the Antonio Chávez case
explicitly states, in defense of its decision, that in order for the court to
confirm title it must appear “that the claimant could have gone into the
courts of Mexico and demanded as a matter of right that his title be made
complete and perfect, had the territory not been acquired by the United
States.”86 As this article has discussed, continuous settlement and/or use of
a grant were the most important criteria for perfecting title under both
Spanish and Mexican governance.87 Although Reynolds asserted “the
conditions of occupation, settlement and cultivation by the original grantee,
prior to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, had not been complied with,”88
testimony before the Surveyor General and at the CPLC trial, particularly
that of Jesus Baca and the alcalde who placed Chávez in possession of the
Grant, contradicts that assertion. Title to the Grant had clearly been
perfected under both customary and formal usage.
Moreover, if the court wished to assert that the claimant must have
been able to “go into the courts of Mexico and demand as a matter of right
that his title be made complete and perfect,” why was the large body of
Spanish and Mexican case law regarding land grants not applied to these
adjudications by the CPLC and the Supreme Court? Land grant historian
Malcolm Ebright asserts:
In New Mexico prior to United States occupation, evidence of
custom was found in the decisions of the alcaldes,
ayuntamientos and the acts of the government. Since English
[Anglo] common law is also composed of decisions in actual
cases, it should not have been difficult for Anglo-American
lawyers and judges to understand Hispanic customary law.

85.
86.
87.
88.

Ely’s Admin. v. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 240–241 (1898).
Decision, supra note 71, at 864–73.
EBRIGHT, supra note 22.
REYNOLDS, supra note 9.
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The problem, then as now, was that these decisions were
never translated, organized and studied the way commonlaw cases are. The United States government had the
expertise to do this, but…it was not in its interest to do so.89
In other words, the CPLC and the Supreme Court did not reference Spanish
and Mexican case law because those courts represented the expansionist
interests of the United States rather than interests of justice and equity. The
Mexican courts would unquestionably have upheld the validity of the
Antonio Chávez claim, and the U.S. government exploited an ungrounded
legal technicality to defeat it.
Reynolds went on to use this case as a precedent to defeat other
valid claims, just as his report to the Attorney General indicated he would.
The June 2004 GAO Report lists eight community land grants that were
rejected by the CPLC “because the granting official lacked authority to
make land grants under Mexican law.”90 Other community claimants
actually abandoned their claims after this decision because their lawyers
advised them it was futile.91 Several private grants were also rejected as a
result of this decision.
A trenchant example of the absurd lengths to which Reynolds, the
CPLC, and the Supreme Court pushed the Hayes decision is the
adjudication of the Nerio Antonio Montoya claim. The Nerio Antonio
Montoya Grant was made on November 12, 1831, so the Colonization Law
of 1828, which explicitly delegated the authority to make grants to the
Territorial Governor, was in effect. Although the Grant was officially made
by the Territorial Delegation, Santiago Abreu, the Territorial Governor and
also the president of the Territorial Delegation, signed the authorization
papers. Reynolds, nevertheless, asserted that only the Territorial Governor
and not the Territorial Delegation was authorized to make the Grant, even
though the Governor presided over the Delegation and signed the
concession. Both the CPLC and the Supreme Court unaccountably upheld
this ridiculous argument and the claim was denied.92
Reynolds was also able to apply this precedent to a group of land
claims whose original grant papers had been lost or destroyed and certified

89.
90.

EBRIGHT, supra note 2, at 133.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO: FINDINGS AND
POSSIBLE OPTIONS REGARDING LONGSTANDING COMMUNITY LAND GRANT CLAIMS IN NEW
MEXICO (2004) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d0459.pdf.
91. See Los Manuelitas claim, SANM, PLC 242 (on file with NMSRCA); Mesita Blanca
claim, SANM, PLC 159 (on file with NMSRCA).
92. Decision, CPLC regarding the Nerio Antonio Montoya Grant (Mar. 25, 1896), SANM,
PLC 20, roll 34, frame 1680 (on file with NMSRCA); Chavez v. United States, 175 U.S. 552
(1899).
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copies had been made by subsequent territorial officials. Claiming these
officials did not have the authority to make copies, he was able to discredit
the grant papers and defeat several community claims for which,
paradoxically, there was other archival documentation, besides the copies
of the grant papers, to underwrite their legitimacy.93 Ironically, in the 1863
Supreme Court case, United States v. Auguisola, 68 U.S. 352 (1863), the Court
asserted:
The United States never sought by legislation to evade the
obligation devolved upon them by the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo to protect the rights of property of the inhabitants of
the ceded territory, or to discharge it in a narrow or illiberal
manner. They have directed their tribunals, in passing upon
the rights of the inhabitants, to be governed by the

93. GAO REPORT, supra note 90, at 118–23 (listing three community land grants that were
rejected because the official who made a certified copy of the grant papers, due to loss or
deterioration of the originals, lacked the authority to certify the copies). See also EBRIGHT,
supra note 2, at 127–42, for a discussion of how the Hayes decision was used to defeat the
Embudo land claim, whose original Grant papers were lost and a certified copy was
submitted to the court as proof of the Grant’s authenticity. Also note that the court was
inconsistent in the standards it applied to parallel cases. Regarding claims whose grant papers
were represented by certified copies rather than originals, in the Town of Bernalillo
adjudication (1897), the CPLC ruled: “We know from our examination of many claims under
Spanish grants…that the practice of perpetuating in this manner the evidence of title…was
common. Indeed, that was the only way that evidence of title in the hands of the people could
be perpetuated.…The papers were passed from hand to hand as the ownership of the
property changed and necessarily in the lapse of time, they became mutilated. It is true that
public records of the proceedings relating to the grants of land were required to be made. But
the sovereignty over the country has been twice changed, once by revolution and once by
military conquest and in addition to that it is a matter of history that there have been times
of turmoil in which all civil government in the country has been endangered. In view of these
facts, it is not remarkable that the ancient records should now be in an unsatisfactory and
imperfect condition. It has also many times been proven before us that spoilations of the
records have occurred since our own government acquired jurisdiction over the country. It
is manifest that if claimants should now be held to the strictness of proof which would be
required in the establishment of a title of American origin, great injustice would be done, and
the measures established by the government for the purpose of carrying out its treaty
stipulations, would be made the instrument of defeating that purpose.” Decision, CPLC
regarding the Town of Bernalillo Grant, SANM, PLC 258, roll 53, frames 392–94 (on file with
NMSRCA). However, in the Embudo Grant adjudication (1898), which was also represented
by a certified copy of the original Grant papers, despite a preponderance of other archival
evidence that demonstrated the legitimacy of the claim, the CPLC, in a divided decision,
apologetically asserted that within the restrictions of its mandate and because of the precedent
of the Hayes decision it had no choice but to reject the claim. Chief Justice Joseph R. Reed and
Justice Wilbur F. Stone, acknowledging the blatant injustice of the decision, wrote a dissenting
opinion reminding the other Justices that the Court had confirmed the Town of Bernalillo
Grant on “substantially the same character of evidence which the court now rejects.” Bowden,
supra note 14, at 1201.
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stipulations of the treaty, the law of nations, the laws, usages
and customs of the former government, the principles of
equity, and the decisions of the Supreme Court so far as they
are applicable. They have not desired the tribunals to conduct
their investigations as if the rights of the inhabitants to the property
which they claim depended upon the nicest observance of every legal
formality. They have desired to act as a great nation, not seeking in
extending their authority over the ceded country, to enforce
forfeitures, but to afford protection and security to all just rights
which could have been claimed from the government they
superseded.94
An essential element in the practice of imperialism is the fabrication
of spurious rationales that purport to legitimize invasion and dispossession.
The dispossession of Indo-Hispano New Mexicans through the chicanery
of men like Matthew G. Reynolds and George W. Julian, and the attempt by
the General Accounting Office to justify their actions in its 2004 Report
should, I believe, be viewed in that light.95

94.
95.

United States v. Auguisola, 68 U.S. 352 (1863) (emphasis added).
GAO REPORT, supra note 90.

